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A bstract
This paper examines the history o f  electricity in Lesotho from the 
colonial time to the present within the broader fram ew ork o f  socio­
economic development. Taking the 'Muela hydropower plant, the 
Lesotho Electricity Corporation and the Southern African Power 
Pool as illustration, the paper raises three related arguments. First, 
that the project nature o f  the power plant severely limited its 
potential relative to the need to e lectr ifj the countryside for 
purposes o f  expediting socio-econom ic transformation to make it 
possible fo r  the Basotho nation as a whole to attain a higher 
standard o f  well being. Second, that privatisation o f  electricity as a 
social product is inimical to the Government o f  Lesotho's professed 
policy o f social provisioning with a view to achieving national 
development and eradication o f  rural poverty. Third, the paper 
identifies a significant disparity between policy assertions and 
evidence on the ground. The paper argues further that the 
ambiguities surrounding policy statements on national 
electrification in Lesotho are less o f  an accident than testimony 
that the capital intensive nature o f  the 'Muela hydropower 
technically excludes the rural poor from  being the immediate 
beneficiaries o f  the pow er from  the station.
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Introduction
This paper examines the history of electricity as well as 
elements of the politics associated with the idea of 
electrification in Lesotho. Electrification is viewed as a 
conscious and deliberate policy effort on the part of the 
political state designed to enable the affected population to 
attain a higher level of living. The paper focuses on the 
potential of the 'Muela hydroelectric plant, one of the major 
components of the Lesotho Highlands W ater Project 
(LHWP), to contribute to the future socio-economic 
development of Lesotho. Theoretically, the paper is inspired 
by a materialist perspective that hypothesizes the public 
policy intent of electrification as being to drive the national 
economy to a higher technical basis than that which would 
have been achieved prior to the beginning of the 
electrification initiative (Lenin, 1977). The m ain question 
which the paper seeks to address is ways in which, apart 
from the obvious question of m agnitude, the 'Muela 
hydroelectric project differs from  other electrification 
initiatives in Lesotho. It is argued that the project nature of 
this component of the LHWP as well as the divestiture of the 
Lesotho Electricity Corporation (LEC) cripple their potential 
regarding the need to electrify the country to expedite social 
transformation, economic growth and poverty reduction. 
T he paper argues further that it is not accidental that the 
ruling, urban-based, political elite is poised to benefit 
disproportionately -  compared to the rural-based majority of 
the populace -  from the proceeds of the LH W P in general 
and Muela hydro power plant in particular. Viewed from 
this angle, the elite will be criticised for having joined in the 
ranks of the broader coalition of forces w hose net effect is 
impoverishment of the majority of the rural populace by
denying them access to the electric pow er generated in their 
n a m e  (Wilson and Ram phele, 1989).
There are six sections in this article with this Introduction 
counting as Section I. Section II provides an argum ent of the 
association betw een electrification and econom ic growth. 
Section III provides a brief history of electrification in 
Lesotho from the turn of the last century to the present. 
Taking the 'M uela hydropow er plant as a case. Section IV 
not only highlights what this author regards as inherent 
limitations of the project approach or 'projectisation ' of 
national developm ent (see H irschm an, 1958; 1967) but also 
discusses the lack of congruity between the project approach 
to national developm ent and the advent of a neo-liberal 
agenda and the resulting suppression of national interest as 
evidenced by a sudden move towards wholesale 
privatisation of governm ent-ow ned enterprises with special 
emphasis on the LEC. Section V situates the 'M uela 
hydropower plant w ithin the wider context of the Southern 
African Power Pool (SAPP). The final section sums up the 
arguments and concludes the paper.
The paper has been assem bled on the basis of data 
collected over a period spanning m ore than 5 years through 
a combination of m ethods, including perusal of primary and 
secondary sources, interview s with key personnel of 
relevant institutions, personal com m unication with 
knowledgeable people and experts in the field of energy, 
and content analysis of speeches by some prominent 
politicians in the country.
The association of electrification and econom ic growth
A glance at the history of electrification in other countries 
suggests a close association betw een the expansion in the 
use of electricity and chosen econom ic policies, as well as
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specific industrialisation and m anufacturing strategies. This 
association has often increased the need for incorporating 
the provisioning of other forms of energy into countrywide 
strategies for econom ic transform ation and growth. One 
country where these processes ran hand in hand was the 
Soviet Union in the early 1920s. The peasant-based Soviet 
econom y in that period prompted the Bolshevik government 
to insist on the intrinsic importance of electrification as a 
precondition for transform ing a predom inantly agricultural 
econom y into an industrial one. It is for this reason that a 
brief look at the history of electrification in Lesotho and a 
review of how the Bolsheviks conceptualised electrification 
as a means of transform ing the Soviet econom y to higher 
levels of productivity is in order.
For Lenin and his party, the link between 
industrialisation and electrification was a sym biotic one. It 
was argued passionately that "industry cannot be developed 
without electrification" (Lenin, 1977: 450). The task of 
enabling the Soviet econom y to 'catch up' with those of the 
W est would be inconceivable w ithout this important 
national comm odity. Differences of opinion on what needed 
to be done gave rise to what might be termed the 
electrification debate at the formative stages of the Soviet 
power. A distinctive elem ent of this debate was the fact that 
the Bolsheviks construed it as part of their long-term 
political programme with far-reaching econom ic and social 
dimensions. Not surprisingly, when, for the first time, the 
Bolsheviks formulated their theoretical political plan 
outlining the basis for the need to consolidate the link 
between the w orking class and peasantry, provisioning of 
electric power for both agricultural and industrial 
production was central. W ithout adequate and reliable 
supply of electric power, m echanization of both agriculture
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and industry would be unimaginable. Sustainability of such 
operations, the Bolsheviks reckoned, could only be 
predicated upon " a plan of work aimed at restoring our 
prnnomv and raising it to the level of up-to-date technical 
development. W ithout a plan of electrification we cannot 
undertake any real constructive w ork" (Lenin, 1977: 498 
[author's em phasis]; see also Dobb, 194b; 1961). O ne vexing 
question that this theoretical blueprint invites is whether 
availability of electricity could be an autom atic solution to 
the multi-faceted structural problem s confronting the 
developing world of both the 20th and 21st centuries, of 
which Lesotho is an integral part.
The idea of electrification as an essential strategy for 
socio-economic transform ation becam e widely accepted 
throughout the nineteenth and tw entieth centuries. Not 
surprisingly, even such institutions as the W orld Bank have 
become instrum ental in seeking to influence the overall 
policy direction of developm ent finance especially as it 
relates to provisioning of clean energy for developm ent 
(World Bank, 2006). As with other aspects of Lesotho's 
economy, what could be termed the electrification debate in 
Lesotho is inextricably linked to that of South Africa for the 
obvious reasons of structural connections betw een the two 
countries.
In South Africa issues relating to electrification have not 
only clearly entered the sphere of public policy research but 
have also been driven by a com bination of econom ic activity 
and socio-econom ic and political pressure. Civic 
organisations have been instrum ental in pushing the issue of 
electrifying the under-served com m unities of the country 
high on the state transform ation agenda. Eberhard, a 
prominent scholar at South Africa's Energy Research 
Institute, has addressed questions such as those raised above
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in the context of the underdeveloped parts of that country, 
Outlining reasons why grid electrification of urban and peri­
urban areas would be the preferred energy supply option for 
domestic use, Eberhard has argued that "[o]nce the initial 
extension fee has been paid, electricity is in most cases 
cheaper than other fuels for cooking, heating, and lighting" 
(in Wilson and Ram phele, 1989: 328).
Eberhard arrived at this bold conclusion on the basis of 
two surveys, one carried out in Umlazi in 1979, the other in 
suburbs around Cape Town in 1982. The form er survey 
determined that households without electricity spent on 
average R42 a m onth on fuel while typical middle-income 
households with electricity spent on average R18 a month, 
using energy in a safer and more convenient form. [The 
latter survey] ... revealed that families w ithout electricity 
could pay up to three times as much on dom estic energy 
than those fam ilies which had access to electricity (Wilson 
and Ram phele, 1989: 326).
These surveys helped to expose the fallacy of the popular 
myth that low-incom e groups and rural com m unities cannot 
afford electricity. On the contrary, as Eberhard has stressed, 
"the truth is that [the poor] can no longer afford not to have 
electricity" (in W ilson and Ramphele, 1989: 326). This 
argum ent underpins the point that provision of electricity 
needs to be seen more as a deliberate state policy to enhance 
the ability of the poor to reduce poverty and less as a means 
to advance the profit motives of corporations or the 
aspirations of the private sector.
According to Eberhard (in W ilson and Ramphele, 1989), 
grid electrification can be justified on several grounds. For 
the im mediate purposes of this paper, however, it will 
suffice to spell out only two such grounds. First, the use of 
electricity for domestic purposes is environm entally safer
than the other form s of the so-called poor m an's energy 
options -  including coal with its high ash content. Second, 
access to electricity can perm it the perform ance of a wider 
array of entirely new household tasks. It m ust be 
emphasised, nevertheless, that the benefits of grid 
electrification are not autom atic; they flow from a clear 
vision and com m itm ent to a future that the leadership of any 
country sets for itself. This presupposes not only visionary 
leadership but also long term planning, w ithout which 
electrification schem es in the Third W orld will never be 
immune from unforeseen problems relating to short-term  
political expediencies. To borrow from  Eberhard,
[tjhought should be given as to how the financing o f  
electrification could be structured so as not to unfairly  
burden the initial consumers. ... Innovative financing  
schemes could also be developed to ease the initial costs o f  
purchasing a range o f  electrical appliances. For 
electrification to be successfid, it should be coupled with an 
integrated package o f  energy consenmtion measures 
including better house insulation, solar water heating, and 
awareness programm es o f  ways to use electricity efficiently  
in the home (in Wilson and Ramphele, 1989: 326).
In Lesotho, the argum ent that the poor cannot afford 
electricity has been usually justified on grounds that low- 
income and rural com m unities tend to be averse to the use of 
electricity, yet another myth often popularised by the ruling 
elite to rationalise the bankruptcy of official developm ent 
programmes. In 1998 one official of Lesotho H ighlands 
Development Authority (LHDA) m ade reference to a rural 
electrification scheme, which LHDA abandoned because 
people of the targeted areas rejected it for fear of 
electrocution. In her words: " ba ne ba re motlakase ke kese o tla 
bn chouka" [they perceive of electricity as gas/thing or
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substance that chokes] (Mothepu, 1998). This unconvincing 
claim was made in response to one caller who suggested that 
a country-w ide electrification program m e would go a long 
way towards curbing the incidence of robbery and theft 
(especially of livestock), the two social ills that had been on 
the rise since the 1980s. Seem ingly unsophisticated but 
profound, this caller's point was that "masholu a tSabti 
khamja" [thieves are averse to light] (unidentified caller in 
conversation, 1998).
The usefulness of the message contained in the foregoing 
viewpoints is, however, limited to the significance of 
electrification at a micro or household level. As suggested 
earlier, the degree to which issues such as these can be 
extrapolated to macro level depends on the political will of 
the ruling elite of a given country. We will now turn to 
highlighting elem ents of the debate in the specific context of 
Lesotho. Before doing that, an attempt at the history of 
electricity in Lesotho will be in order.
A History of Electricity in Lesotho
According to Stephen Gill (2004) the com ing of electricity to 
Lesotho dates back to the early 1900s when the Paris 
Protestant m issionaries introduced it to their headquarters at 
Morija. Throughout the early years of the twentieth century 
not much happened in terms of network expansion. Only in 
the 1930s did the colonial governm ent begin to operate a 
small plant erected to supply Maseru. This plant was 
replaced, in the early 1960s, by a 2M W  thermal plant. As 
with other sectors of the economy, the colonial government 
did little by way of making noteworthy im provements in the 
supply of electricity or its expansion to the rest of country.
In 1967, one year after independence, a M em orandum  of 
Agreem ent was signed between the G overnm ent of Lesotho
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(GOL) and the Electricity Supply Com m ission (ESCOM ) 
(renamed ESKOM  -  used throughout the paper -  since 2002) 
of South Africa for the latter to supply electricity to Lesotho. 
This agreement made it possible for electricity to be 
extended to other adm inistrative points and growth centres 
(Khalema, 1992). Three years later, in 1969, the Lesotho 
Electricity Corporation (LEC) was established under the 
Electricity Act of the same year. In terms of this Act, LEC's 
responsibility was so broad as to include the management, 
transmission and distribution of electricity throughout the 
country (Governm ent of Lesotho (GOL), 1969). In practice 
this has m eant that the corporation's activities would 
encompass the establishm ent, acquisition, m aintenance and 
operation of transm ission lines as well as power generation 
plants (Khalema, 1992). This arrangem ent forced the status 
of virtual monopoly on the corporation, in keeping with the 
contemporary developm ent discourse (GO L,1987). 
Establishment of LEC marked only one step in what was to 
become a fairly com plex, if bloated, parastatal system  in the 
country.
For the first 35 years of its existence, LEC thrived 
essentially by means of a crude caricature of an im port 
substitution strategy marked by purchasing electricity from 
ESKOM expressly for resale w ithout adding any more value 
to the purchased com m odity through further processing. By 
the early 1990s, LEC boasted of 1,100 kilom etres of high- 
tension transmission lines, 17 sub-stations for dow n-rating 
voltage and more than 400 distribution transform ers for 
stepping power to 380 volts. Typically, this tail-end resale 
has resulted in the situation where the cost of electricity in 
Lesotho became m arkedly higher than that of ESKOM .
ESKOM supplies LEC through four intake points: 
Maseru, Hololo Valley, M aputsoe and Peka. Apart from the
History o f Electricih/ in Irsotho and the Place o f  'Muela 115
ESKOM  supply there are a few m ini-hydro and diesel 
operated plants in such parts of the country as Oxbow, 
Sem onkong, MantSonyane, Tlokoeng and Q acha's Nek 
(LHDA, 1989). Until recently, only the MantSonyane mini­
hydro plant had been connected to the main grid. 
Establishm ent of these small plants is, supposedly, in j  
keeping with governm ent's declared policy of extending 
developm ent to the peri-urban and rural areas. LHDA takes 
the provision of electricity to the m ushroom ing, largely 
unplanned and unreserved areas as not only being an 
integral part of this policy but also a cornerstone of the LEC 
mission (LH DA ,1989:3). Isolated experim ents with 
alternative forms of rural electrification have done little to 
alter the larger picture of the country-w ide electrification 
process. This begs the question as to how the Lesotho 
governm ent's 'declared policy' m easures against the 
evidence on the ground.
The pattern of access to electricity for domestic use 
continues to be skewed in favour of the urban, peri-urban 
and grow th centres. At the close of the 1980s only 2 percent 
of the total population was estim ated to have access to 
electricity (LHDA, 1989; Petersson, 1990). In 1988 this 
percentage translated into 10,800 households. Five years 
later, the accessibility rate was estim ated to have risen to 5 
percent (GOL, 1992: 100-101) while in 2005 it was reported 
to have reached the 11 percent mark (Privatisation Unit of 
the M inistry of Finance and D evelopm ent Planning, 
2003).N evertheless, such an increase has not altered the basic 
pattern of access to this vital com m odity: the residential 
sector -  m ost of which is in the urban areas -  accounts for a 
staggering 90 percent of the total national domestic energy 
consumption. The transport sector consum es up to 7 percent, 
while industry, com m erce and governm ent together account
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for the rem aining 3 percent. Most of the biggest consum ers 
of electricity are urban-based. If the rate of connection 
increases by the projected factor of 1,7, the LEC consumer 
base will reach a peak of 50,000 households by the year 2010. 
Of these 6,000 - 10,000 households will be rural-based (GOL, 
I997b:140; GOL, 1997c). The fact that this pattern 
discriminates against rural areas, especially those with little 
prospects of becom ing grow th centres is hard to exaggerate.
In theory at least, the conception of the 'M uela 
hydropower plant signaled the greatest possibility for 
altering the existing pattern of access to electricity in 
Lesotho. Why this possibility is yet to turn into a reality is 
the subject m atter of the present article. To explain that 
failure it will be necessary to look beneath the surface of the 
'Muela hydropower plant. Before doing that however, it will 
be necessary to conclude this section with another argum ent 
on the association betw een electrification and economic 
growth.
Electrification in Lesotho has not been marked by such a 
robust debate as has been the case in South Africa or other 
countries with strong econom ies where electrification 
programmes were initiated with a view  to enhance economic 
growth. For instance, in South Africa since the 1920s, when 
the Electricity Supply Com m ission (ESCOM ) was 
established as a public utility, such a link has been 
unambiguously clear. This has been the case in Lesotho. One 
consequence of this difference is that consideration of the 
subject of electricity in Lesotho has been a virtual monopoly 
of consultancy com panies, donor agencies and governm ent 
officials. Public reference to the need for electrification has 
thus been lim ited to political rallies where individual 
politicians have used it as a cheap strategy for attracting 
electoral votes.
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One of the most ambitious pronouncem ents on social 
transform ation that the ruling elite in Lesotho ever set for 
itself, even though it does not directly relate to 
electrification, can be found in the Fourth Five- Year 
Development Plan. This document outlines the overall 
am bition of the political state in Lesotho in the five years 
from 1986 as being
the structuring o f  the econom y with a view to providing 
better living conditions fo r  the people through the strategies 
o f  accelerated development and equitable distribution of 
wealth [includingj maximising national income, creating 
internal employment and reducing poverty levels through 
rural development (GOL, 1987:5).
That 'accelerated rural developm ent' constituted the 
cornerstone of developm ent strategy in Lesotho could not be 
clearer. By the mid-1980s policy makers in Lesotho were yet 
to view electricity as a crucial factor in rural transformation. 
H ow ever vaguely defined, rural developm ent was seen as 
key to social transform ation. The incongruity between 
theory and practice of developm ent policies in Lesotho 
becomes more obvious when measured against answers to 
the follow ing questions regarding the provisioning of 
electricity: to w hat extent has the generation of hydropower 
at 'M uela been tailored to align with strategies embraced in 
the aforem entioned developm ent blueprint? W hat is the 
evidence that the electricity generated at 'M uela hydropower 
plant has been used to contribute directly to poverty 
reduction and the betterm ent of the living conditions, 
especially for those living in the rural areas of the country? A 
careful look at the context of the 'M uela hydropower plant 
may help to lay the basis for answers to these questions.
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'Muela H ydropow er Plant in the W ider Politico-econom ic 
Context of Regionalism
The discussion in this section has three dim ensions. First, it 
situates the 'M uela hydropow er plant within the wider 
context of the politics of a neo-liberal agenda and 
regionalism which combined in various ways to give birth to 
the twin ideas of a regional power pool and the drive to 
privatize national electricity utility com panies/corporations 
and/or their transform ation into 'A uthorities.' Special 
emphasis in this regard will be on LEG and the Lesotho 
Electricity Authority (LEA). Second, it takes the reader 
through the divergent viewpoints regarding the 
attractiveness (or lack of it) of 'project approach' as a vehicle 
for achieving national developm ent. Third, it attem pts to 
unravel the contradictions and am biguities that seem to 
stand in the way of projects such as the 'M uela hydropower 
plant functioning as a catalyst for achieving the possibility of 
rural transform ation through electrification.
The 'M uela hydropow er plant is part of the Lesotho 
Highlands W ater Project, a huge inter-basin water transfer 
project consisting of a series of dams connected through a 
network of tunnels. Its sole purpose is to generate electricity 
for Lesotho's dom estic and industrial needs. Situated in 
what was once the Ha Nooe village, approxim ately 30 
kilometers north of Botha-Bothe town, the 'M uela complex 
comprises the pow erhouse cavern and associated 
waterways, galleries, adits and access facilities. According to 
the original plan, the plant was to become functional in 1996. 
In terms of the treaty that brought the LHDA into being, the 
responsibility of raising funds for the construction of this 
power plant w ould rest with the Governm ent of Lesotho. 
The European Union (then EEC) pledged full support to 
enable Lesotho to com plete this venture on schedule (Kratz
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1989). It was anticipated that, when com plete, the project 
would add no less than 125 kilometres to the then existing 
high-tension transm ission grid within the country (Bereng, 
1998).
Even though at its nominal rating the plant is capable of 
producing up to 81 MW, currently the 'M uela hydropower 
plant produces only 72 MW, which is reportedly adequate 
for national dem and, which makes it possible for Lesotho to 
export surplus electricity in the amount of 15M W  to ESKOM 
during sum m er m onths when national consum ption is low. 
During peak periods, especially winter, Lesotho is 
com pelled to im port something in the region of 30MW of 
electricity from  ESKOM  (Sefali, 2007).
Throughout its gestation and early implementation 
stages, the 'M uela power plant was overshadow ed by two 
contesting positions. One viewpoint held that the 
hydropow er station amounted to no more than a mere spin­
off whose realization hung precariously on the success of the 
overall water transfer project. In stark contrast to this 
perspective was the official representation, which
painstakingly created the impression, first, that the 
hydropow er com ponent was made part of the Highlands 
project at both the initiative and insistence of the Lesotho 
Governm ent, and second, that by virtue of the foregoing, the 
Lesotho Governm ent adopted the 'M uela hydropow er plant 
as a thoughtfully calculated alternative source of energy to 
ESKOM  (Thoahlane, 1991). The position adopted in this 
article is that that the apparent absence of a wider public 
debate in relation to national electrification and its potential 
contribution to rural com m unity-based industrial
developm ent in the initial and official policy documents of 
the H ighlands project could not have been incidental. 
Rather, it reflected the fact that the policy m aking machinery
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of the state understood the project predom inantly in terms 
of how far it would enhance Lesotho's credit worthiness in 
the books of the international financial institutions. The 
'Muela hydropow er plant cam e as an add-on intended to 
correct an inexcusable omission.
Com m entators and writers on the project tended to 
oscillate betw een these two extremes. As would be expected 
of a G overnm ent document, the Fourth Five Year Plan was 
quick to declare forthrightly: "T he major thrust for Lesotho 
during the next two decades will be the tapping of the vast 
hydropower potential in the highlands" (GOL, 1987: 140). A 
similar sentim ent was repeated three years later in a 
different context. Forecasting the potential contribution of 
the 'M uela hydropow er to national w ellbeing by the year 
2000, architects of Economic Options did not equivocate on 
their vision of the electrification problem in Lesotho by the 
year 2000. "O u r vision for the year 2000," they declared,
is an electricity sector characterised by locally-sourced, 
expanded and efficient supply to urban and rural centres. 
The 'Muela hydropower has a capacity to satisfy most o f  the 
dom estic needs o f  the country. The prospects fo r  this ... are 
reinforced by current efforts to harness the country's 
hydropower potential with mini-hydropower stations (GOL, 
1997a: 142).
Needless to say, it will soon be ten years since the year 2000 
elapsed, yet nothing approxim ating the vision as expressed 
in the foregoing extract has happened. In spite of that 
shortcoming, it is gratifying to note that this vision 
represents an acknow ledgem ent by the political and 
commercial elite, albeit tacitly, that there is a real "possibility 
of improving the quality-of-life for (sic) the [nation by] 
making electricity accessible and affordable" (GOL, 1997a: 
142) At the sam e time the extent to which this vision was
couched in the neo-liberal language of international financial 
institutions was also remarkable: the national elite
recognised the significance of mini hydropow er plants in 
rem ote areas less for a) their strategic position for national 
socio-econom ic transform ation, and b) their environmental 
value, but more for being cost-effective "because they do not 
involve long distance transmission costs" (GOL, 1997a: 142).
The idea of power pooling and trading regionally in 
electricity can be traced back to the mid-1970s when the 
Apartheid governm ent comm issioned Henry Olivier to 
review regional hydro-electric power sources that could 
benefit the South African economy by enlarging its economy 
of scale. The idea was to connect the existing transmission 
lines in South Africa to those in Zambia, Rhodesia (modern 
Zim babwe), M ozam bique, Malawi, Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of the Congo -  DRC) and Tanzania. In a report 
released in 1976, Olivier saw such a move as having the 
potential not only for South African econom ic growth but 
also the possibility for a Pan-African transm ission grid as 
well as other attendant econom ic benefits. Thus he wrote:
With a Pan-African power transmission grid, it will be 
possible to export and import electricity on the best use or 
most econom ic basis. There will be fiirther by-products, such 
as the need to build the necessary dams, tunnels and stations. 
This would help materially to open up the presently remote 
areas (Showers, unpublished paper).
N otwithstanding the international sanctions, the steady 
growth of the South African econom y m eant that the 
demand for electricity was correspondingly growing, in turn 
w arranting a search for alternative sources of energy to coal- 
powered electricity sources. This search was a precursor to 
the present power pooling initiatives (Showers, 
unpublished paper). Of im mediate interest to this paper is
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the fact that O livier's report indicated no grid connection for 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, im plying that these 
would be treated as mere extensions of the larger and 
stronger econom ies.
Southern African Developm ent Com m unity (SADC) 
member countries are characterized by a high degree of 
variation in terms of energy (especially electricity) needs and 
the potential to produce hydro power. In the latter part of 
the 1990s the disparities arising out of this have fueled the 
impetus for the integration of the energy sector and 
promotion of regional energy trade. In August 1995, an 
Intergovernmental Agreem ent creating the Southern African 
Power Pool (SAPP) was signed confirm ing "the region's 
commitment to expanding electricity trade, reducing energy 
costs and providing greater supply stability for the region's 
12 national utilities" (SAPP, 2002: 1). SA PP's primary 
objective is to provide reliable and econom ic electricity 
supply to the consum ers of each m em ber state.
SAPP is part of the neo-liberal agenda of regional 
arrangements w hose operation was intended to fall under 
two electrical subsystem s -  northern and southern -  with 
three key players in each subsystem: Zim babw e Electricity 
Supply Authority (ZESA), Zambia Electricity Supply 
Corporation (ZESCO) and Societe National d'Electric (SNEL) 
in the northern system while ESKOM, Botswana Power 
Commission (BPC) and Nam power would be the major 
players in the southern sub-system. Other member utilities 
would be aligned to the interests of these m ajor players 
through a netw ork of power interconnections. The 
underlying principle is that through these interconnections 
"countries are able to source electricity in bulk and then 
redistribute it nationally at cheaper prices" (SAPP, 2002: 1). 
As with other form s of regional arrangem ents, the problem
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with SAPP is that it tends to cast a shadow on an individual 
country's sense of self-sufficiency. At any rate the SAPP 
Secretariat reckons that over the years SA PP is increasingly 
"evolving from a cooperative to a com petitive pool" (SAPP, 
2002: 1) where the profit motive, rather than utilitarian value 
for social advancem ent, becomes the prime reason for power 
generation.
One of the key features of SA PP's m arketing strategies 
was the introduction of a spot market known as Short Term 
Energy M arket (STEM) which, according to Elmissiry (2000) 
marked the beginning of SA PP's transform ation from a 
cooperative approach to energy trade arrangements to a 
fully com petitive, market-based entity. According to 
Showers (unpublished paper), one m ajor effect of this 
transform ation was that electricity ceased being an essential 
com ponent of developm ent infrastructure with a potential to 
contribute to an improved standard of living of the 
populace. On the contrary it assumed the character of a 
comm odity just like cabbage or asparagus. In her words:
No longer was electricity to be a component o f the 
infrastructure essential fo r  improved quality o f  life and 
econom ic development; it was to become a commodity that 
could be produced, valued, exported, and speculated upon-a 
new kind o f  'cash crop' that changed perspectives on 
investment in large-scale energy projects, including the large 
ciznl engineering costs associated with hydroelectric power 
dams (Showers, unpublished paper: 19).
Just as the prospect to sell surplus electricity to Europe is 
what "keeps Grant Inga alive", (Showers, u n p u b l i s h e d  
paper: 24), so has the attraction of selling surplus electricity 
from the 'M uela hydropower plant to SA PP diverted the 
original idea behind the construction of the plant. This is the 
dilem m a that has befallen the 'M uela hydropow er plant.
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The idea of prom oting "th e  developm ent and integration of 
African power system s through the interconnection of 
n e tw o rk s , exchanges of experience and know -how  as well as 
the pooling energy resources (Union of Producers, 
T r a n s p o r te r s  and D istributors of Electric Pow er in Africa 
(UPDEA), (in Show ers, unpublished paper: 14)," is not in 
itself a  misconception. Rather it is an argum ent that m akes 
perfect economic sense in the sam e m anner that the sale of 
L e so th o 's  surplus w ater to South Africa's thirsty industrial 
h eartlan d  was justified while the m ajority of the rural poor 
co n tin u e d  to travel long distances to fetch w ater for basic 
h o u seh o ld  needs. The problem  with this approach is that it 
tends to push the horizons of the possibility for the poor to 
access electricity further and further away.
At the beginning of the 1980s African countries had com e 
to reckon with the im portance and central role of energy as 
well as its contribution to industrialisation, poverty 
reduction and rural developm ent, global and sustainable 
development, regional cooperation and sub-regional 
integration (African Energy Com m ission [AFREC], n.d.: 1). 
To this end, and as part of the Lagos Plan of Action adopted 
in 1980 by the O rganisation of African Unity (OAU ), the 
Extraordinary Econom ic Sum m it of OA U  recom m ended the 
creation of an African Energy Com m ission w hich w ould be 
given the responsibility "to  ensure, co-ordinate and 
harmonize the protection, preservation, developm ent and 
the national exploitation, m arketing and integration of the 
energy resources of the African continent" (em phasis as in 
original) (AFREC in Show ers, unpublished paper : 20-21). 
This larger picture represents SA D C 's long-term  regional 
integration strategy regarding the energy sector within 
which the generation of electricity from  the 'M uela 
hydropower plant needs to be understood.
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The 22nd of January 1998 saw the inauguration ceremony of 
the com pletion of the water transfer com ponent of the 
LHWP, sym bolising Lesotho's readiness to discharge water 
to the Gauteng industrial area at the rate of 18 cubic metres 
(18,000 litres) every passing second. The ceremony was 
som ething of a regional showpiece. Exactly twelve months 
later (on the 22nd January, 1999) the 'M uela valley witnessed 
yet another cerem ony, this time marking the commencement 
of generating electricity. One local new sletter proudly 
described the occasion as "m arking the entry of Lesotho into 
the production of hydro electric power in the southern 
African region" (National University of Lesotho, 1999: 8).
The occasion to celebrate power generation did not come 
anywhere close to the fanfare of the water transfer 
cerem ony. Nor did the King of Lesotho feature in the 
program m e of events. Instead, it w as the Prim e Minister 
who delivered the keynote speech clearly calculated to give 
the political w eight it was thought to be carrying. Regarding 
both the generation and expected availability of electricity, 
the Prime M inister was less assertive than would be 
expected of a politician seeking to attract a sizable number of 
followers. He equivocated:
we are informed that the generation o f  electricity has begun 
at this plant, such that the power available in the country 
comes from  here. Fellow countrymen this is a ven/ important 
step forw ard. Everyone expects electricity to be widely 
azmilable, not only in grozvth points but also in the znllages 
including households. This zvill have an impact on the lives of 
the Basotho nation. We thus, hope that relevant institutions 
zvill ensure that this happens and that electricity is availed at 
affordable rates. At the same time, zve knozv that initially the 
cost zvill still be high due to the fact o f  loan/debt servicing
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(author's own translation from  the original Sesotho text,
Mosisili, 1999:4-5).
The tentative nature of Mr. M osisili's speech m irrored a two- 
level dilemma. At the individual level it suggested lack of 
assertiveness on the part of a politician with regard to the 
potential role of electricity in transform ing the lives of the 
people of Lesotho, especially rural dwellers. Yet the Prime 
Minister found it politically expedient to say som ething 
about provision of electricity especially in the presence of 
such dignitaries. At another level the luke w arm  nature of 
the speech was indicative of the extent to which the 
completion of the 'M uela hydropow er plant had becom e 
something of a conundrum  for the political elite in the post­
adjustment era m arked by the neo-liberal agenda including 
privatisation of electricity utilities. It was for this reason that 
Mr. Mosisili found it expedient to exonerate him self by 
referring the m atter to "ba ikarabellang" (those who m atter or 
stakeholders) im plying conveniently that such a 
responsibility was not within his sphere of political 
influence.
At the institutional level, this dilem m a related to the 
need for clarifying the responsibilities and fine tuning the 
separation of roles/duties "betw een the LEC as the 
distributor and the LHDA as the supplier in respect to the 
Muela hydropower [plant]" (GOL, 1997a: 142; 144). At the 
political and policy level, the elite in Lesotho has had to 
choose between clinging onto the oft stated populist slogan 
of "taking-services-to-the-nation" and the Bretton W oods 
institutions' neo-liberal proclivity towards m arket forces to 
sort out national issues and priorities. The evidence 
concerning the provisioning of electricity suggests that the 
political elite in Lesotho has been inclined to follow  the latter 
option. The essence of this dilem m a becom es m ore glaring
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when measured against the background of a country 
consisting mainly of low-incom e groups and rural 
communities with little capacity to handle the 
aggressiveness of a supply of electricity left entirely to the 
logic of the market (GOL, 1997a). This double-edged 
problem can be explained in terms of two related factors. 
First, the political environm ent in which the completion of 
the project took place was different from  the one in which its 
conception and implem entation got under way. Second, 
because of its weak economic base Lesotho cannot easily 
wriggle out of the conditions set forth by the bankrollers of 
the project, even when such conditions prove to be no longer 
in Lesotho's best political interest. N othing testifies to this 
dilemma better than the issues pertaining to the 
privatisation of the LEC, as will be seen shortly.
A few local scholars have identified with the sentiments 
outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. Thoahloane is one 
such, to whom the sequence of events is clear: that the 
realization of the adverse effects of the cum ulative expenses 
of importing electricity from ESKOM  prom pted the Lesotho 
government to search for alternative sources of energy, 
finding one in 'M uela. In his words,
the Lesotho Government decided to generate its own energy 
supply and thus lessen its dependency on South Africa's 
energy. This led to the inclusion o f  the hydropower 
component in the construction o f  Phase 1A o f  the Lesotho 
Highlands W ater Project (Thoahlane, 1991: 86)
However, like other proponents of this perspective, 
Thoahlane was less concerned with asking questions about 
the relevance of electrification as a countryw ide political 
programme of the state for purposes of expediting rural 
transformation. Sim ilarly, it is not atypical for writers of this 
orientation to turn a blind eye to issues pertaining to class
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interests poised to derive the real value for money invested 
in the project in its current form. It is not by accident that the 
closest Thoahlane com es to identifying the political 
orientation of the 'M uela hydropow er is when he observes 
correctly that "The developm ent of electricity in Lesotho has 
been in part determ ined by ... the influence of the 
international agencies" (Thoahlane, 1991: 88). This brings us 
to the threshold of highlighting som e elem ents of the 
development discourse characterising what could 
conveniently be called a ‘projectised  approach' to national 
development, which in turn provides the wider context 
within which both the conception and im plem entation of the 
'Muela hydropower needs to be understood.
Elements of 'P rojectised  A p p roach ' to N ational 
Development
Up until the early 1980s, discourse on national development 
was characterized and driven by m odernization theory, a 
paradigm that viewed the world in terms of discrete 
dichotomies and contrasts such as tradition versus 
modernity, the W estern bloc versus Eastern bloc, the First 
world versus the Third W orld and so forth. The 
modernisers" viewed the m ain object of developm ent as 
being one of bringing traditional sectors of the economy into 
the fold of modern ones. From  the mid-1980s, however, 
technocrats linked to international donor and financial 
agencies supplanted m odernisation enthusiasts and moved a 
step further by placing an unprecedented emphasis on value 
for money in projects. M aking projects cost-effective became 
something of a standard vocabulary of world's leading 
financial institutions. Alm ost sim ultaneously, another battle 
of ideas emerged and spaw ned a debate that elevated the 
profile of the notion of sustainability of development
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projects within the world developm ent community and 
associated institutions. One of the central concerns of this 
debate grappled with the question whether 
'projects/schem es', or 'program m es,' promised a more 
reliable route to sustained socio-econom ic transformation.
In the opinion of the European M inisters the desirable 
option was unmistakable. Thus, they urged individual 
member states and the EEC as a whole
gradually to group the schemes they finance together to form, 
rather than isolated projects, programm es o f  significant 
financial size with a number o f  components which, without 
necessarily being defined in detail from  the word go, were 
coherent and properly spaced out in time (European 
Community, 1987:50).
Doubtless, the thinking along these lines was prompted by 
the high mortality rate of Third W orld developm ent projects. 
Explanations of failure differed according to the orientation 
of those who offered them. From the m odernizers' point of 
view, projects collapsed due to the resilience of tradition. For 
its part, technocracy associated the failure of projects with 
lack of managerial expertise and technical skills on the part 
of the political elite, which invariably becom es responsible 
for im plem enting projects in host countries. Rooted in the 
1980s, this viewpoint gained currency in the 1990s (see 
World Bank, 2001).
W hat these variations have in com m on is that none of 
them saw the high mortality rate of projects as having 
anything to do with the inherent dynam ics of the project 
approach to national development. Thus, to the extent that 
this paper is a contribution to this debate, its argument is 
that, as long as the 'M uela hydropow er plant remains a 
project, its vast potential is bound to be highly 
circum scribed, more so, when its latent functions are
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expected to perform  outside the orbit of the fram ework of 
the domestic energy sector. The capital-intensive character of 
the plant, like that of the dam itself, tends, alm ost 
automatically, to exclude the interests of the rural poor from 
being its im m ediate or direct beneficiaries (see also 
Petersson, 1990). This technical exclusion of the rural 
population from  the electricity generated at 'M uela power 
plant leaves the urban dwellers as autom atic and/or direct 
beneficiaries. M oreover, the situation is more likely than not 
to be worsened by the "low  projected revenues" (Petersson, 
1990 : 23) from  the sale of power from this plant. The 
projection of low revenues from  the sale of electricity from 
Muela seems to have been recognised not only by 
consultants such as Petersson; rather, highly placed officials 
of the LHDA were also alive to it. Asked whether generation 
of electricity at 'M uela would lead to a significant reduction 
of the cost of electricity in Lesotho, Mr. Tseko Bohloa, then 
Assistant Chief Executive of LHDA, offered an emphatic 
no/ reasoning that tariffs on electricity in Lesotho were tied 
to ESKOM tariffs (Radio Lesotho, ' Seboping ' January 20, 
1998).
As indicated variously in this paper, patterns of 
electricity consum ption in Lesotho suggest even bleaker 
prospects for the 'M uela hydropow er to be effectively used 
for the uplift of the rural poor, let alone for promoting rural 
industrialisation. Indeed, Petersson (1990) is right in 
observing that " it  is som ething of [a] paradox that although 
water is the only natural resource in abundance in Lesotho 
suitable for generating hydropow er, com m ercial energy 
consumption is am ong the low est in the w orld".,. Unless 
there is radical policy shift on the part of the political elite, 
this situation of Lesotho being am ong the lowest countries in 
terms of per capita consum ption of electricity for domestic
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use is unlikely to change for the better for many years to 
come.
The idea of rural electrification in the Third World is a 
paradise of paradoxes. For instance, W ilson and Ramphele 
(1989) tell a story that succinctly depicts such a paradox in 
the case of South Africa, a country that in the 1980s 
produced 60 per cent of electricity in the entire continent. 
Yet, for alm ost two-thirds of the total population in that 
country, the majority of whom were rural dwellers in the 
early 1990s, access to that energy remained a distant dream. 
The most striking image of this irony was the
sight o f  a group o f  elderly black women, each carrying on her 
head a load o f  firew ood weighing up to 50kg, passing 
underneath the high-tension cables that carry the electric 
energy between the towns (and farm steads) o f  the Republic 
(Wilson and Ramphele, 1989: 44).
If this irony has yet to become a fact of life for many people 
living in the m ountainous areas of Lesotho, high-tension 
cables have become a familiar scene to m ost Basotho living 
in the lowlands, especially along the main road from Maseru 
in both northerly and southerly directions. It is indeed 
som ething of a paradox that for many Basotho, completion 
of the 'M uela hydropow er plant has only m eant the ability 
to pass underneath high-tension cables carrying energy from 
this power station to the main urban and grow th centres of 
the country. The irony becomes even more glaring when 
measured against the fact that 184 households have had to 
relocate due to construction of power lines.
Southern African Power Pool, Rural Electrification and 
Divestiture of LEC
Part of the argum ent of this paper is that rural electrification 
and such arrangem ents as envisaged under the aegis of 
SAPP are strange fellow travelers. A national electrification 
programme stands less chances of success if it is designed 
more to align with the conditions set by international 
financial institutions and donor agencies than as an 
internally bred strategy for the betterm ent of the living 
conditions of the rural poor. To the extent that the 'M uela 
hydropower plant is designed to meet the neo-liberal agenda 
of such institutions, its potential contribution to uplifting the 
living standard of the rural poor is sure to rem ain highly 
constrained. It is on the basis of these considerations that we 
proceed to illustrate the relationship between the LH W P -  of 
which the 'M uela hydropow er is an integral part -and  the 
institutional cooperation betw een the w orld's m ost powerful 
financial institutions and Lesotho as part of the adjusting 
world. Initially Lesotho's adjustm ent appeared som ew hat 
benign, given the dependence of its econom y on South 
Africa. Yet, this could be more apparent than real when 
considering that even in Lesotho the Structural Adjustm ent 
Programme (SAP) processes wrapped up with a 
privatisation agenda, hence the initiative to privatise the 
LEC.
A clear sense of the political clim ate that nurtured the 
birth of the LH W P can be gleaned from  w hat Ake (1996: 93) 
aptly depicts as "[o]n e of the greatest draw backs of SA P." If 
only to adopt his passion to one of the central argum ents of 
this paper, Ake is w orth quoting at length. In Africa, he 
argues,
the SAP regimes started before the [current] wave o f
democratization; a basis hardly existed fo r  subjecting SAP to
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a dem ocratic mandate. The African leaders whose 
performance had contributed to the need fo r  adjustment were 
neither in the habit o f  subjecting public policy to democratic 
determination nor willing to expose their governance record 
to public [scrutiny andj debate. In any case, by the time SAP 
became an issue [these leaders] had invariably run out of 
options. ... As a result, the internal and international 
promoters o f  SAP were disposed to its authoritarian 
imposition (Ake, 1996: 93).
By extension, Ake would view the fact that the politics of 
adjustm ent in Africa has been so typically authoritarian and 
violent, more as a reflection of these leaders' messianic faith 
in SAP policy prescriptions than an accident of history.
M easured against the backdrop of the foregoing extract, 
the logic behind the apparent irony of the W orld Bank's 
readiness to churn out huge sums of money into a country 
with so gloom y econom ic prospects as Lesotho would make 
sense. Indeed one possible explanation for this apparent 
irony is the hypothesis that the W orld Bank staff advisers 
pinned their hope on the revenue expected to accrue from 
the royalty fund estim ated well in excess of US $68million 
annually for fifty years (World Bank, 1987; Petersson, 1989). 
The Bank's soft attitude can further be explained by two 
other possibilities. The first is that, when it entered the 
adjusting world, Lesotho did not really have a serious 
external debt service problem, in spite of grow ing evidence 
of public debt throughout the 1980s (Petersson, 1989). This 
position served to strengthen Lesotho's creditworthiness in 
the books of the world's top financial institutions. Second, 
during the initial im plem entation stages of the project, 
powerful financial institutions were keen to win South 
Africa back into the fold of international financial markets. 
One strategy of achieving this objective was to entrench the
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s t r u c t u r a l  econom ic ties between the two countries, while 
the outcome of the collapse of apartheid remained uncertain. 
The highlands w ater project provided the best opportunity 
to achieve this objective.
One conditionality of SA P with direct bearing on 
electrification was the cuts on public expenditure. The spirit 
of this condition engendered a state cam paign to shake off 
the responsibility of financing the large cost of connecting 
the rural areas to the main grid. It com es as no surprise that 
subsequently, officialdom  has continuously blam ed difficult 
terrain for its failure to make electricity available to the rural 
communities. One m ajor com m issioned study on the state of 
the art of rural electrification in Lesotho put it blatantly:
[ijnvestment in costly, capital intensive projects to connect 
(rural) villages to the existing network system would 
represent a misallocation o f  scarce financial resource 
because considerable distances would have to be covered by 
power lines on a very difficult, mountainous and ragged 
terrain in order to connect most o f  these villages (Bulane, 
1990: i)
The problem with this way of looking at things is that it is 
less attracted to thinking about possibilities of alternative 
methods of lighting up the rural, rem ote and inaccessible 
areas of the country (CORE International, Inc. 2003).
Characteristically the LEC and international donor 
agencies speak in one voice in this regard. Too eager to 
please the financiers and because of running out of options, 
the political elite has been quick to appropriate the language 
of these institutions. Less clear, however, were m atters of 
policy. For instance, the link between the LEC and LH D A 's 
rural electrification plans rem ained murky for a long time.
As part of its privatisation program m e and through its 
privatisation arm  called the Privatisation Unit (PU), the
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Lesotho governm ent embarked on the Lesotho Utilities 
Reform Project (LURP) in 2001. Jointly financed by the 
W orld Bank (US$26.6m), the African Developm ent Bank 
(US$8.6m), the European Union (US$200,000) and the 
Lesotho G overnm ent (US$2.0m) -  a m ajor component of 
LURP related specifically to the energy sector as it was 
intended to accelerate the privatisation of LEC and facilitate 
the establishm ent of the Lesotho Electricity Authority (LEA). 
The underlying belief was that this, and other reforms under 
the aegis of LURP, would provide stable, transparent and 
m odern utilities fram eworks as well as "pave the way for 
private sector investm ent capital and management to 
participate in the im provem ent of the coverage, efficiency, 
affordability and reliability of electricity ... services" 
(Privatisation Unit, 2002: 2).
The LEC was one of the 32 parastatals earmarked for 
divestiture when the Lesotho governm ent embarked in 
earnest on the privatisation course from the early-1990s, a 
period that coincided with the return to democratic rule. 
O fficialdom  has it that the utility was listed for divestiture 
because it was so afflicted by rapid and significant 
deterioration of perform ance that by the year 2000 the 
follow ing signs of m alfunction had reached unacceptable 
levels in the context of a liberalising economy:
■ low operating efficiency: at the ratio of 27:1 the LEC 
had m ore than double the num ber of staff needed for 
a utility of its size;
■ substantial technical and non-technical losses;
■ substantial financial losses as a result of total collapse 
of its billing system  in July 1997;
■ high operating costs and unsustainable investment 
program m es;
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• lack of accurate data regarding its custom er database;
■ inability to operate its com m ercial activities 
effectively due to high costs of its operations 
(overstaffing, high electricity purchase costs);
■ tariffs that were substantially below the true cost of 
supply in the country. Yet these had not changed, 
even in nominal terms, since 1994; and
■ inability to respond to the increasing demand for new 
electricity connections (Privatisation Unit,, 2002: 2).
To a country set on a liberalising course there could be no 
more convincing argum ent for the need of governm ent to 
shake off its shoulders the responsibility for a costly and 
highly inefficient organisation.
Two interw oven moves in the direction of full-scale 
privatisation were taken in 2001. One was the introduction 
of an interim m anagem ent structure known as Interim  
Management Task Force (IMTF) to run the enterprise. The 
objective of this arrangem ent was two-fold: i) to arrest the 
LEC's further deterioration and ii) to clean up the 
organisation in preparation for privatisation. The other was 
the institution of what cam e to be known as the Sales 
Advisory Group (SAG) in the latter part of the year. As spelt 
out in PU's first annual report the role of the SAG was
to identify the best possible basis on which to offer to strategic 
investors in order meet the GOL's objectives o f  improving  
access to electricity, ending the reliance o f  LEC on State 
budget, and improving the operational perform ance o f  [its] 
business (Privatisation Unit, 2002: 8).
In addition to this task the SAG was also charged w ith the 
responsibility to advise on privatisation options taking into 
consideration issues relating to the structural separation of 
electricity functions, com petition, the SA PP trading, 
interface with the 'M uela Hydropow er plant, capital
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structure and other institutional requirem ents for a 
meaningful sale of the corporation.
Enactm ent by parliam ent of the Lesotho Electricity 
Authority (LEA) Bill towards the end of 2001 was yet 
another move by governm ent in pursuit of full privatisation 
of the electricity utility. The Royal Assent in April 2002 made 
the prospect of disposing of the utility even more imminent. 
However, delays in the subm ission of draft documents for 
Cabinet approval rendered the prospect murky, thus 
necessitating the extension of caretaker m anagem ent of the 
LEC by a further period of eighteen (18) months, to end in 
Septem ber 2004. The Southern African Development 
through Electricity (Pty) Ltd (SAD-ELEC) was chosen for the 
assignm ent (Privatisation Unit, 2002). Developm ents in the 
course of 2004 not only once again necessitated the extension 
of m anagem ent to Septem ber 2005 but also led to a revised 
im plem entation schedule for the privatisation of the utility 
(Privatisation Unit, 2004: 8).
In terms of general duties and functions, the LEA will be 
expected to perform  quite a range of responsibilities. These 
include, but are certainly not limited to, the following:
■ prom oting the expansion of electricity supply in
Lesotho, where it would be econom ic and cost-
effective [to do so];
■ ensuring the operation and developm ent of safe,
efficient and econom ic electricity sector in Lesotho;
■ ensuring the security of the supply of electricity in 
Lesotho;
■ ensuring the promotion of sustainable and fair
com petition in the electricity sector where it is 
efficient to do so;
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■ protecting the interest of all classes of consum ers of 
electricity as to the terms and conditions and price of 
supply;
■ ensuring ... the continued availability of electricity for 
use in public hospitals; and centres for the disabled, 
aged and the sick;
■ ensuring the financial viability of efficient regulated 
electricity undertakings;
■ ensuring the collection, publication and dissem ination 
of inform ation relating to standards of perform ance 
by licensed operators and on the electricity sector in 
Lesotho for use by the industry, consum ers and 
prospective investors;
■ participating, in consultation with the Minister, in 
regional and international m atters relating to the 
regulation of electricity in Lesotho; and
■ developing annual supply targets for the purpose of 
ensuring that such services are accessible to the 
widest num ber of electricity users (GOL, 2002: 770).
A mountain of duties indeed! Nonetheless, two issues stand 
out from this mountain. One relates to the sheer 
omnipresence of such concepts as 'economic/ 'efficient,' 
'viable,' 'cost-effective,' no doubt indicative of neo-liberal 
basis of the w hole privatisation cam paign. Couching the Act 
in these terms, it was assum ed, would invoke the magic of 
attracting private investm ent' and 'prom oting local private 
sector development' in the 'electricity sector'.
The other relates to the regionalisation of the subject of 
electricity in 21st century Southern Africa in terms of which 
the SAPP has assum ed the characteristic role of a parent 
institution with powers over national institutions. In 
carrying out its m andate as the national energy regulator,
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the LEA would have first to consider the interests of the 
parent body. Part VII of the Act spells out this condition 
much more clearly with respect to the im port and export of 
electricity. Even though the restructured LEC will be 
allowed to continue importing electricity from  ESKOM 
pursuant to existing agreements, it can only do so "subject to 
conditions laid down by the Southern African Power Pool." 
(GOL, 2002: 803) Evidently this is what participating "in 
regional and international matters relating to the regulation 
of electricity in Lesotho" (GOL, 2002: 771) will also entail.
The story of the LEC divestiture represents an interesting 
twist of the privatisation process in Lesotho. Compared to 
the Plant Vehicles Pool Services (PVPS), the Lesotho Flour 
Mills, the Lesotho Bank and other form er state-owned 
enterprises that became earmarked for privatisation, the LEC 
seems to be the only enterprise where governm ent has been 
particularly keen to work for the most favourable terms. In 
turn, this has led to a situation where the divestiture has 
dragged on before any conclusive deal is reached. Asked 
why this has been the case, an official in the PU secretariat 
pointed to the failure of bidders to meet the requirements as 
set out in the tender documents (M phale, 2005). However, a 
further look into the record suggests that part of the 
explanation may be that there were divergent views 
amongst key role players. M oreover, the general public 
claimed not to understand the whole process despite the 
PU's efforts to regularly publicise the exercise. Still others 
opposed the project from "ideological standpoints or other 
vested interests" (Privatisation Unit, 2002:22). W ith specific 
reference to the restructuring of the LEC, authors of the PU's 
first annual report were candid enough to reveal, however 
tacitly, that political sensitivities' have had their fair share in 
stalling the negotiations, thereby necessitating "the process
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... to be approached in a disciplined and structured m anner" 
(Privatisation Unit, 2004).
W hether or not this situation became directly responsible 
for the future direction of the negotiations is not entirely 
clear from the record. Incontrovertibly clear, however, is that 
the simple strategy of "privatisation by sale of maority 
shareholding" (Privatisation Unit, 2004: 9) has become a 
subject for extensive discussion with the W orld Bank 
supervision mission since 2003. The outcom e of these 
discussions has been a shift away from the preferred method 
in favour of a public service concession approach that came 
to be approved by Cabinet in mid May of the same year 
(Privatisation Unit, 2004: 9). According to the PU 's third 
annual report, this outcom e has in turn m eant that, 
compared to outright privatisation by sale of majority 
shareholding, a "public service concession approach" 
(Privatisation Unit, 2003:10) has become the preferred mode 
of divestiture.
The dom inant tendency to explain projects within 
narrow econom ic param eters has invariably led 
policymakers to fall short of recognizing the fact that 
restructuring of the econom y is an econom ic and political 
issue. This failure was a direct outcom e of the 
developmentalist ideology which became pervasive in post­
independence Africa. As indicated above, Lesotho has been 
no exception to this pattern. Instead of the kind of 'pork 
barrel' projects once so fam iliar in the West, in Africa 
projects have invariably been used by the ruling elite to 
garner the political support of those in whose name they are 
initiated. As a result, the elite usually establish amazing 
networks of patron-client relations with the econom ically 
deprived sections of the populations w ho never stop hoping 
that some day the elite will fulfill their promises. In reality,
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however, the political/bureaucratic elite never misses out on 
taking full advantage of the disadvantaged position and 
organizational weakness of the rural poor. The story of the 
'M uela hydropower plant exem plifies this contradiction. 
Ostensibly established for purposes of reducing dependency 
on ESKOM  as the supplier of electricity to Lesotho, the 
power generated from the plant has com e to be diverted 
from its nominally stipulated purpose and hived off to 
meeting the new regional needs of power pooling.
Summary and concluding remarks
This article has attem pted to provide a history of electricity 
in Lesotho from  the colonial times to the early twenty-first 
century. The m ulti-faceted nature of the subject has made it 
inevitable for this analysis to pursue m ultiple arguments. 
One of these is that the possibility of enabling the majority of 
the people of Lesotho to have access to the electricity 
generated from the 'M uela hydropower plant has been -  and 
is likely to remain -  curtailed by the fact that the plant came 
more as an add-on to the overall LHW P rather than an 
integral com ponent of it; it was never conceived as an 
independent program m e intended to play a role in the 
transform ation of lives of the rural poor. This problem is 
further accentuated by the fact that countries like Lesotho 
whose survival depends on handouts from donor agencies 
often find them selves acceding to the dem ands imposed by 
donor agencies instead of crafting their own development 
programmes based on the realities of their national 
conditions. The w eakness of both the econom ic base and the 
state renders these countries highly susceptible to the whims 
of the w orld's most powerful and influential financial 
institutions. The logic of the evidence upon which this study 
is based suggests that this has been the case with both the
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building of the 'M uela hydropow er plant as well as the idea 
of privatising the LEC.
At another level, this study has sought to dem onstrate that, 
more than thirty years after independence, the pattern of 
electrification in Lesotho suggests continuity with the 
colonial policy rather than a notable shift from it. Available 
evidence further suggests a pattern of electrification that has 
been heavily skewed to favour the consum ption patterns 
and lifestyle of urban-based elite to the alm ost total 
exclusion of the rural folk. Neither the establishm ent of the 
LEC nor the birth of the 'M uela hydropow er plant seems 
sufficiently poised to alter the inherited colonial pattern of 
provisioning electricity. Typically, the excuse for this 
Inherent feature would be that the cost, both of getting 
connected and utilising the electric power, is largely 
unaffordable to the m ajority of the people of Lesotho, most 
of whom live in rural areas.
Over the years the official policy (and practice) of 
electrification in Lesotho has fallen short of the materialist 
perspective w hich inspires this article, that is, of the 
potential role of electricity in elevating the national 
economy to a higher stage of social progress. Most of the 
documentary evidence used for the study suggests that, up 
to the 1990s, the potential role of electric power in socio­
economic transform ation was meekly acknowledged by the 
political and econom ic elite in Lesotho. It was not fortuitous 
that in his speech m arking the official opening of the 'Muela 
hydropower station, Prim e M inister Mosisili could only 
timidly rem ark on the potential role of electricity in social 
and economic transform ation. Only in the 2000's do we 
encounter isolated incidences of indicative statements 
(predominantly by politicians either at political party rallies 
°r at the official opening of village electrification schemes)
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that proffer a direct link between the two. Sim ilarly it is not 
coincidental that before the 2000s virtually none of the 
political parties has ever been daring enough to use 
provision of electricity for poverty reduction as an integral 
part of their electoral cam paign strategies.
If establishm ent of the Lesotho Electricity Authority was 
a response to the need for Lesotho to qualify for a status in 
the SAPP as a regional arrangem ent, surely that did little, if 
any, towards approxim ating the m aterialist approach of 
electrification that informs the argum ents being advanced in 
this article. Neither did it do much to enhance the possibility 
of m aking electricity accessible to the majority of the 
populace, as profit motive becomes the determ ining factor in 
the production and stocking of electricity.
The problem  with rural electrification as currently 
conceived is that it does not seek to transform  the rural areas 
into a dynamic socio-econom ic entity capable of promoting 
socio-econom ic activities and program m es aimed at 
reducing rural-urban imbalances on a sustainable basis.
In reality, therefore, the gap is huge between numerous 
policy statem ents on electrification and the evidence on the 
ground, particularly as regards the role of electricity in 
elevating the lives of poor people to a higher standard. At 
best, the rate at which electricity has been made accessible to 
the under-privileged sections of the populace in Lesotho 
since independence has been negligible. This unimpressive 
record suggests continuity of the colonial policy of availing 
facilities to the bureaucratic elite in the administrative and 
growth centres. Electrification with the express purpose of 
rural transform ation and m otivation of econom ic growth has 
yet to be conceived in Lesotho. Thus the potential role of the 
electricity com ing out of the 'M uela hydropow er in uplifting
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the living conditions of the rural poor in Lesotho remains 
highly curtailed.
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